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BOOK REVIEWS

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Cambone, Stephen A. A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1998. 262pp. $23.95

Stephen Cambone is the director of research
at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University.
A former senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
Cambone is obviously well qualified to
undertake work that focuses on a proposed reorganization of the National Security Council (NSC). Cambone
approaches his work with vigor and an
insider’s knowledge of the workings of
the U.S. government’s highest nationalsecurity entity. He also extensively uses
the knowledge and expertise of two colleagues, Patrick J. Garrity of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory and Alistair
J. K. Shepard of the University of
Aberdeen, Scotland. They have included
valuable appendices for students of national security affairs on the major interests and issues that surround national
security policy development, as well as a
historical synopsis of the various national
security councils used by past presidents
and how the institution has evolved.
Cambone has included a compendium of
important presidential directives.
Cambone’s principal argument is that it
is time—now that the end of the Cold
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War is nearly a decade in the past—to reevaluate the National Security Act of
1947 and the institutions created by that
watershed law. Moreover, Cambone asks
his readers to consider what, if any, institutional changes should be implemented
to ensure that the United States is properly prepared for national security policy
planning in the post–Cold War era. He
is attempting, by his own admission,
to conduct an organization-and-process approach to the question of revising
the 1947 National Security Act; he is
largely successful.
Cambone boils down the present-day
debate over national security policy making
to two essential features. He identifies
one side as the issues faction and the
other as the interests faction. “Issues” advocates emphasize such things as religion, ethnicity, and human rights. These
national security analysts focus on the
need for countries to conform to international laws and norms. They emphasize
the protection of the rights of individuals
against the power of the state. They rely
heavily on international agreement to
settle problems. The “interest” faction,
on the other hand, is less concerned with
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the legal authority of the international
community and more interested in the
construction of a system that manages risk
to the United States as a sovereign state.
However, Cambone argues that the real
problem is that neither “issues” nor “interests” elements within national-security policy-making circles can agree on
an overarching concept for, or definition of, the nation’s security. The author’s answer is to suggest a new model
for national security decision making
that eschews the Cold War mentality and
methodology for policy making and takes
into account the new paradigms of the
post–Cold War era.
Cambone reviews how past national security policy was developed. He then
proposes a reorganization of the NSC into
five directorates: crisis management, regional affairs, home defense affairs, finance and trade, and science and
technology. A “dual-hatted” cabinet secretary would head these directorates. In
this way, the president’s control over national security policy development would
be strengthened.
While his suggestions for improvement
are well thought out and well intentioned,
his proposals may prove nearly impossible to implement. First and foremost, such
a proposed reorganization would need
strong political support on Capitol Hill.
A new National Security Act would likely
entail a tremendous amount of debate, as
senators and congressmen attempt to influence the legislation. One need only recall the highly rancorous and largely
unhealthy debate over service roles and
missions following the passage of the
1947 law to understand what might occur
if a new national security law were passed
along the lines that Cambone suggests.
This is not to say that the United States
should not consider a new law; Cambone
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simply needs to be aware that national
security policy has never been, and most
likely never will be, entirely devoid of
politics.
Nonetheless, Cambone’s model for a new
NSC is a logical one. Efficient and elegant, if implemented it would maximize
the president’s power to influence the
creation and accomplishment of national
security policy—something that the NSC
and the national security advisor are supposed to facilitate. Further, it would
make maximum use of the entire executive branch of government and take the
pressure off an understaffed and
ill-equipped White House to oversee national security policy, development, and
implementation. Yet the suggestion of a
dual-hatted cabinet secretary as head of a
national security “directorate” could prove
disastrous. Cambone ignores Washington’s deeply entrenched organizational
bureaucracies and their tendency to “socialize” appointed cabinet officials into
their own particular cultures. It has long
been axiomatic in the nation’s capital
that the president’s worst political and
bureaucratic enemies can reside in his
own cabinet; in 1867 such a situation
nearly drove an unpopular president
(Andrew Johnson) from office. To make
matters worse, most cabinet officials have
rather short tenures in office. Thus the
Washington bureaucracy knows full well
that these political appointees will be
moving on sooner or later; it waits them
out. Finally, presidential cabinet officials
are usually chosen not for their expertise
but for political expediency. Therefore, it
is very likely that the person who would
serve as a “directorate” chair might be
thoroughly unqualified for such a position of responsibility. Although the
way that national security policy is
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developed today is certainly not optimal,
would Cambone’s system be better?
Despite his failure to consider the second
and third-order effects of enacting the
system he proposes, Cambone provides
the basis for a great academic discussion
over future national security policy and
how it is developed. It is a topic that needs
to be discussed, and as the author has
emphatically pointed out, the time is
now. This point is hard to refute. As the
world’s sole remaining superpower, and
as the debate and divergence over how
policy gets developed becomes stronger,
the United States must reflect on how to
improve its national security decision
making structure.
In sum, Cambone and his colleagues
have provided a good point of departure
for a debate on how the United States
should develop and implement future
national security policy. There are many
things to consider, and this book will get
us started.
CHARLES NEIMEYER

Naval War College

O’Hanlon, Michael. Technological Change and the
Future of Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 208pp. $42.95

Over the past several years, the U.S. military has officially embraced the idea
that rapidly evolving technologies soon
will lead to a profound change in the
conduct of warfare. The need to innovate in response to a prospective revolution in military affairs is the central
theme of Joint Vision 2010 and similar
force-planning documents. Some studies, such as the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel, have
concluded that only immediate and
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radical transformation to new systems,
new operational concepts, and new organizations will enable the U.S. military
to retain its battlefield dominance.
Michael O’Hanlon, however, is not convinced. In his view, most calls for transformation lack any systematic or rigorous
analysis of how emerging technologies
might specifically change the character of
combat in the coming decades. Thus the
goal of this book is to provide realistic
projections of technological possibilities
that offer a better idea of how the U.S.
military might best proceed in future research and acquisition.
O’Hanlon examines a wide range of
militarily relevant technologies, in two
broad categories: those primarily electronic (sensors, computers, and communications), and those primarily mechanical
(vehicles, ships, aircraft, and weapons).
From this survey he offers an evaluation
of where evolving technologies are likely
to provide new capabilities over the next
two decades, and where significant force
limitations are likely to remain.
In the realm of electronics, O’Hanlon
expects continued advances in computers
and communications but foresees no imminent breakthrough in sensors that will
significantly improve one’s ability to detect and track the adversary’s activity. He
specifically rejects the idea that the battlefield can be rendered “transparent.”
On the mechanical side, he sees no
near-term developments that will allow
maneuver and strike forces to become
sufficiently light, fast, fuel efficient, or
stealthy to allow profound improvements
in speed of movement or lethality. Thus
he concludes that proponents of transformation provide neither a compelling
case for a near-term revolution in warfare
nor any adequate idea of what the military should be transforming itself into.
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O’Hanlon’s general projections of future
technologies appear reasonable. Yet the
reader would be more assured of the author’s conclusions if his technical evaluations did not rely so heavily upon articles
in newspapers and popular periodicals.
One can be justifiably skeptical that information drawn from Army Times, Defense
News, or even Aviation Week & Space
Technology fully reflects the broad range
of scientific research and development
throughout government, industry, and academia, both in the United States and
abroad. Likewise, O’Hanlon’s general dismissal of the future military challenges
posed by China, Russia, and North Korea
is somewhat cavalier. It would have been
useful had O’Hanlon made clear his personal qualifications to provide an authoritative evaluation of such a wide range of
technology projections and foreign military
developments. He states that he presented
his findings to “a number of weapons scientists and technology experts,” but he
does not identify them or indicate
whether they agreed with his conclusions.
O’Hanlon uses his projections of future
technology as the basis for a modernization strategy that is intended to promote
“defense innovation” without increasing
the defense budget. He proposes major
reductions, up to two-thirds in such “expensive next generation platforms” as the
F-22 and F/A-18E/F, in order to fund improvements to existing systems and a
broad range of initiatives in research, development, and experimentation. However, most of his recommendations tend
to be as vague as the assumptions he is
challenging. For instance, O’Hanlon approves of the acquisition of “new fleets
of unmanned aerial vehicles,” because it
“appear[s] generally sensible.” He states
that up to two billion dollars a year might
be needed to outfit combat units with
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“internet capabilities” but does not make
clear whether he is referring to the commercial Internet, classified information
networks, or some other type of equipment-interoperability initiative. Likewise,
he makes a broad plea for the military to
“avoid service parochialism and foster
jointness” but does not elaborate on how
best to balance the advantages of organizational unity (as distinguished from systems
interoperability) against the important contribution of interservice competition to the
process of military innovation.
O’Hanlon’s basic thesis is certainly valid.
As he points out, the fact that none of the
military services has actually committed
to major changes in its force structures,
operational concepts, or organizations is
evidence in itself that proponents of innovation have yet to articulate a compelling argument for a very different U.S.
military. This book is far from the final
word on military technology and transformation, but it may serve to stimulate
the proponents of major change to engage in a more detailed debate.
JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS

Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Moskos, Charles C., John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, eds. The Postmodern Military: Armed
Forces after the Cold War. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2000. 286pp. $45

Ask a soldier or military analyst to describe the “postmodern military,” and
you are likely to get an answer that includes
high technology, precision weapons, information operations, and possibly (especially if he or she is associated with the
Navy) network-centric warfare. Much of
the recent literature on military affairs

4

War College: Book Reviews

concentrates on these technology issues, and
an observer might be forgiven for believing
that such operational and technical differences are what separate twenty-first-century
military forces from their predecessors.
This collection of essays describing the current state of military affairs in the United
States and twelve other Western-oriented
democracies takes a very different and welcome approach. The editors, well known
authorities in the fields of military sociology and civil-military relations, examine
the nature of post–Cold War militaries
from the point of view of how military
forces are organized and how they relate
to civilian society.
Some of the issues raised will be familiar
to anyone who has followed the debate in
recent years over a possible crisis in
civil-military relations in America. This
book, however, goes well beyond that issue to posit a general model of how militaries in Western democracies are
changing in the post–Cold War world.
As distinct from the “modern” military
organization, which the authors trace
from the French Revolution to the end of
World War II, and the “Late Modern”
military that prevailed from 1945 to the
end of the Cold War, the “postmodern”
military is described as one in which military forces undergo a loosening of ties
with the nation-state. Postmodern military forces are characterized by an erosion of traditional martial values, a
decrease in their sense of an identity separate from civil society, and a change of
purpose from fighting wars to nontraditional missions, often involving, or
authorized by, international and multinational entities. Kosovo is described as
“the first Postmodern war,” while the
Gulf War, involving a conventional military invasion and state against state
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conflict, is seen as a “throwback” to the
late-modern (Cold War) era.
On the basis primarily of the American
experience, the editors describe trends in
postmodern militaries, including several
hot-button topics. What are the missions
of militaries today? What is the relationship between the military and the media,
and what is the public attitude toward
the military? How fully are women and
homosexuals to be incorporated?
The virtue of this book is that it is not
just another rehash of the arguments
concerning familiar issues. The essays, all
by prominent sociologists, review how
well militaries in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom reflect the postmodern model. The essays
thus provide useful overviews of how
those countries are adapting to many of
the same forces that are shaping the
American military. They may provide
cautionary lessons for military officials
and decision makers in the United States
by underscoring, for instance, how terribly wrong things can go in “military operations other than war.”
In one extreme example of modern military disaster, the Dutch military still has
not fully recovered from the failure of the
Dutch 3d Air Mobile Battalion to defend
the “safe area” of Srebrenica, Bosnia, in
1995. Bosnian Serb forces massacred
thousands of Bosnian Muslims after the
Dutch battalion allowed itself to be disarmed. At the other extreme, members of
the Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to Somalia in 1993 were later
found to have tortured and murdered at
least one Somali youth who had tried to infiltrate their camp to steal. Investigations
revealed other abuses by the regiment, and
eventually it was disbanded.
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These examples underscore the challenges
involved in postmodern military missions,
and they may support the arguments of
those who believe it is dangerous, if not
impossible, to expect war-fighting troops
to conduct “other than war” missions.
The limitation of this collection of essays
is that it does not address the militaries
of greatest interest to American military
officers—those of potential adversaries to
the United States. Because the editors are
specifically proposing a theoretical model
of how Western, democratic militaries are
adjusting to a world with a dramatically
reduced conventional threat, the reader
must look elsewhere to discover whether
or not such nations as China are experiencing the same trends.
Yet there is a great deal here to challenge
those worried about the state of America’s
military today, especially concerning social
issues. One of the most interesting insights
concerns the levels of integration of
women and homosexuals in the American
military, compared with the other countries
surveyed. The case studies show that the
United States is farther along than most
in integrating women but lags behind the
postmodern norm in allowing open homosexuals into its ranks.
The essay on Israel, for example, points
out that the common perception of the
“woman warrior” in the Israeli Defense
Force is a myth. Although many women
played active fighting roles in the Israeli
war of independence, women today are
less fully integrated into the IDF than in
most other Western militaries.
On the subject of homosexuals, the success
of Canada is cited as a possible guide for
other nations. Homosexuals have been
able to serve openly in the Canadian Forces
since 1992, and the removal of previous
restrictions is described as having had
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“virtually no negative impact” on such
matters as recruitment, retention, and
morale. It is not clear if the Canadian experience is directly applicable to the United
States, but the book suggests that perhaps
it is. One of the editors writes that “if the
full acceptance of openly homosexual service
members is only a matter of time, given the
increased tolerance for diversity of sexual
orientation among the general population,
it would be advisable for policy makers in
countries where this is true to move beyond
wishful thinking or abhorrence and consider how such a transition can be made
with minimal negative impact on group
cohesion and military effectiveness.”
Of course, case studies from other countries may do little to persuade those who
have already made up their minds. The
decision of Canadian Forces authorities
in 1998 to approve financial support for
a service member’s sex-change operation, for example, may provide ammunition for both sides in that particular
debate. Whether or not the Canadian
example is one to be feared or applauded, it does suggest how important
it is to study closely the development of
the postmodern military.
ERIK DAHL

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Feiveson, Harold A., ed., The Nuclear Turning Point:
A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and Dealerting of Nuclear
Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 1999. 460 pp. $52.95

Ah, ecstasy! A benign world for the next
two decades. Power politics disappear.
America leads the drawdown, with Russia
following to achieve parity with China,
Britain, and France at about two hundred
nuclear weapons. Worldwide nuclear
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verification becomes practically perfect.
Permanent members of the UN Security
Council agreeably limit their vetoes. It is
all here in this book, the product of the
“Deep Cuts Study Group.”
The authors make no secret of their advocacy for drastic nuclear weapons reductions by the United States and Russia, the dealerting or deactivating of all
weapons to preclude launch on warning,
and announcements of no-first-use policies. The thesis depends on extraordinary
verification beyond today’s technology,
open sharing of weapons storage data,
ironclad control of fissile material, and
an effective worldwide security system.
An actual nuclear war with Russia is
considered unthinkable, despite significant nuclear capability in that country;
although Russia now makes no bones
about its dependence on nuclear weapons, the authors believe intentions can
change. The authors reject nuclear supremacy and deterrence for the unknown of utopian equality.
On the other hand, this book espouses a
number of valid premises. “Military and
political objectives should be achieved
without use of nuclear weapons, if at all
possible.” The Russian early-warning system has deteriorated since the breakup of
the Soviet Union (hence recent U.S.
overtures to share data). Any national
missile defense system must be tested extensively against a host of decoys before
the United States can certify its technical
effectiveness. As a result of conventional
weaknesses, Russia has placed great reliance on nuclear weapons in its military
strategy. The Russian government has
been unable to negotiate effectively on
the issue during the past few years; significant problems remain in the transparency of weapons systems between Russia
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and the United States, and fissile material
stockpiles are hard to verify.
However, if you are looking for a balanced
blueprint for the sizing, alert status, and
verification of nuclear forces during the
next two decades, you will not find it
here. There are several bothersome aspects. The authors cite Article VI of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
chide the nuclear powers for failure to
pursue more rapid reductions despite
enormous changes in the 1990s. Except
for one footnote on page 34, the authors
fail to address the full provisions of
Article VI, which calls for not only “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and . . . nuclear disarmament” but
also “a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective
international control.” With international initiatives not in fact leading to
“general and complete disarmament,”
and with potential aggressors armed as
they are today, the nuclear nations have
no incentive to seek the reductions
envisioned.
The authors place great stress on the
premise that Russian command and control has dangerously deteriorated. In fact,
the system seems to have functioned the
way it was designed in the incident of the
1995 rocket launch from northern Norway. Assertions by the Russian defense
minister indicate this fear is groundless.
A “no first use” declaration concerning
nuclear weapons by the United States is
not in its national interest. The United
States reacts to specific circumstances. It
need not specify how it would respond to
aggression, particularly involving weapons
of mass destruction. Aggressors should
realize that the United States considers
nuclear weapons an absolute last resort,
but aggressors should not be certain how
the nation will respond, or be offered a
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protective declaratory policy. Current
U.S. security assurances, including the “no
first use” negative-security assurance of
1978 concerning the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, serve its interests well.
Low numbers of nuclear weapons would
affect the international security environment and American presidential policies.
First, a limit of two hundred nuclear
weapons almost certainly would necessitate targeting population centers rather
than military facilities. Such a strategy violates international law. Second, the United
States must understand the impact such a
reduction would have on allies to whom it
extends nuclear protection. These countries
can and likely would develop nuclear weapons on their own; proliferation as a result
of destroyed confidence in American nuclear deterrence is not in the nation’s best
interest. Third, other powers may conclude
that they can and should make the investment in nuclear weapons to match the
United States. Today, they have little
chance of succeeding.
The authors harp on the “hair trigger”
readiness (alert) status of U.S. nuclear
weapons without explanation that
launch on warning is only one presidential option. The United States has already removed strategic bombers and
dual-capable aircraft from alert,
detargeted ballistic missiles, removed
nuclear capability from carriers and surface ships, and improved technical
means to ensure against unauthorized
firing or use of nuclear weapons. Russia
has taken similar measures to dealert selected forces. However, none of these
measures are unequivocally verifiable.
There are no magic wands for foolproof
verification. Moreover, in a dealerted
world, a crisis could trigger the most
precipitous, dangerous arms race to
realert that the world has ever
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seen—highly destabilizing and potentially disastrous.
Finally, the real issue is not just numbers
of nuclear weapons, “no first use,” alert
status, or verification but the preservation
of the peace between international entities
that might resort to warfare if the calculus
did not involve nuclear weapons. From
1600 to 1945, wartime casualties of civilian and military personnel generally varied between 1 to 2 percent of the world’s
population (2.6 percent in World War II).
After 1945 the casualty percentage
dropped significantly, and since about
1953 has consistently remained near 0.1
percent. Nuclear weapons have been a key
aspect of the preservation of peace between superpowers for the last five decades. The United States must fully
understand the impact on American leadership of any new arrangement before it
trashes what has proven to benefit world
democracy and freedom.
HANK CHILES

Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
U.S. Naval Academy

Gray, Colin S., The Second Nuclear Age. Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 193pp. $45

Readers of Colin Gray’s earlier works
will not be disappointed by this new
book, nor will his critics be surprised by
his conclusions.
Gray argues that the end of the Cold War
does not mean that nuclear weapons can
be eliminated or forgotten. This book is
indeed valuable for noting, and taking to
task, the wide variety of academic trends
and fashions that have drawn such optimistic conclusions since the collapse of
the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union.
Gray ably points to the many ways in
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which nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction will continue to cast
a shadow over international relations,
even if no single superpower confronts
the United States as a possible enemy.

in pushing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty; such a joint interest was not
nearly so important as the issues that divided Washington and Moscow—and
they were dire.

Gray certainly claims to be in step with
rapidly changing events, while cautioning us against the missteps of others.
Even while he asserts that the role of nuclear weapons will be substantially different in light of all that has happened in
the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
Gray, by stressing a second nuclear age,
emphasizes that such weapons will still
be very important.

In short, Colin Gray’s book may be
right on many of the points it raises,
but it is misleading to advertise it as
heralding something so new as a “second” nuclear age.

However, one suspects that most of the
advice offered here, now that the Cold
War is over, is not really so different from
the advice the author was offering during
the Cold War, advice that did not have
much influence on policy. Gray states
that anti-missile defense is necessary, not
merely desirable. Yet was not his message
earlier that such defenses were desirable,
almost to the point of being necessary?
Gray says that deterrence is not always
reliable—the same message he often advanced with regard to the Soviet Union.
He notes that the American advantage in
conventional weapons, in conjunction
with the enthusiasm over a “revolution in
military affairs,” may be transitory and illusory; however, during the Cold War he believed that the advantage in conventional
warfare rested with Moscow.
Gray scoffs at the analyses that emphasize preventing the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, suggesting instead that such proliferation may be
inevitable—a condition rather than a
problem. But in the old days of the
Cold War, Gray was ready to argue
that one should not make too much
of the Soviet-American cooperation
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As always, Gray displays a broad awareness of the contemporary literature, set
against a deep familiarity with history.
But notwithstanding Gray’s critical analysis of the foibles of those who prematurely think that any “nuclear age” has
come to an end, his own prose at times
comes across as wordy and convoluted,
and his message has not changed.
In sum, the book might amount to what
could have been said as well in one of the
author’s journal articles.
GEORGE H. QUESTER

University of Maryland

Bracken, Paul. Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian
Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age. New
York: HarperCollins, 1999. 186pp. $25

The incorporation of Asia into the Western-dominated international system is
critical for the United States. At present,
the United States is reacting to events in
Asia instead of shaping them. This is the
fundamental message of Fire in the East,
an important book by Paul Bracken of
Yale University.
Asia, extending from Israel to North Korea, has become increasingly visible since
the end of the (primarily Eurocentric)
Cold War. Discussions of Asian strength,
however, have been flawed. Japan has
struggled economically for ten years, and
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it still lacks political and military power.
The intent of Chinese modernization and
its impact on the world community remain subjects of controversy. The 1998
“Asian Flu” wracked the economies of
the infamous “Little Tigers,” thereby diminishing their statures.
Because globalization and nationalism
provide the means and desire to develop
nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons, and the ballistic missiles to deliver them, rising Asian power is increasingly important. As Bracken contends,
globalization is about economics, not
politics, yet it increases national military
potential by providing multiple, inexpensive sources of weapons and military
technologies. Consequently, proliferation in a globalized economy is a
long-term process linked to rising global
scientific and technological prowess. Add
to this existing national security motivations for the development of these capabilities, and it is evident how and why
Asian military power will grow.
These trends are particularly important
because they constitute a second nuclear
age. Recent evidence abounds; for instance, in the wake of the Gulf War it was
discovered just how close Iraq had been
to completing a deliverable nuclear
weapon. Iranian missile and nuclear ambitions are clear, punctuated by a medium-range ballistic missile test in 1998.
The governments of Pakistan and India
conducted flight tests of similar missiles
in April 1998 and May 1999, respectively,
and each country detonated nuclear
weapons in May 1998. China is actively
modernizing both its nuclear capabilities
and ballistic missiles, manifested by an
August 1999 flight test of a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. Much has
been written about the nuclear potential
of North Korea, which continues to
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develop and test ballistic missiles, most
notably in August 1998.
Bracken maintains that these trends
portend the decline of Western military
dominance, in part because Asia and the
West are moving in different directions.
For example, nationalism, considered by
the United States to be an anachronism,
remains a powerful force in Asia. In another case of strategic divergence, Bracken
highlights different approaches to warfare.
The U.S. prefers long-range, stealthy, and
precise conventional attacks that allow
conflict that is quick and bloodless (with
respect to Americans), with less collateral
harm to noncombatants and civilian resources. In the East, indiscriminate weapons and ballistic missiles encourage more
destructive and decisive options.
American policy may encourage the
growth of Asian political-military power.
By preferring an antiseptic form of future
war and by not preparing for casualties,
the United States leaves itself vulnerable
to, and provides incentive for, a nation
that has a greater will to visit destruction
upon its adversaries. This has the further
result of straining the foundations of
deterrence. In the first nuclear age,
the United States sought to deter one
opponent, the Western-oriented and
largely risk-averse Soviet Union. Now,
the United States must deter multiple
powers whose values, belief systems, and
strategic-cultural orientations differ
greatly from those of the United States.
This is not merely an academic point.
Although deterrence during the Cold
War was dangerous, the Cold War never
turned hot. The perils of the second nuclear age, however, have already been
evinced: the Iraqi obstinacy in 1990 that
led to war; the crisis-filled nuclear negotiations with North Korea between 1992
and 1994; the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis
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with China; and the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. These events illustrate a dynamic that pits increased Asian
assertiveness against U.S. desire for the
status quo.
Bracken argues these points persuasively.
Historically, these kinds of systemic
transformations have been the most
dangerous. In the fifth century B.C.,
Thucydides asserted that the Peloponnesian
War had begun due to Spartan fear of
rising Athenian power. Thus, a greater
discussion of how to integrate such diverse, assertive, and armed Asian nations
would have been interesting.
It could be objected that Bracken incorrectly treats many dissimilar nations, governments, and cultures as if they were the
same. Simply stated, it makes a difference
what kind of government is in power. In
addition, other variables are not accounted for, such as the disintegration of
the Iranian theocracy (less than twenty-five
years ago Iran was our staunchest ally in
the Middle East). In North Korea, whether
a “soft landing” or a more violent collapse
occurs could fundamentally influence regional transformation. Last, the effect of
potentially severe ethnic problems in China
is not addressed.
Despite these shortcomings, Bracken deals
convincingly with important topics.
Footnotes are not to be found, and his
bibliography is limited given the breadth
of the subject, but he has integrated information from a variety of fields. Defense
and foreign policy students and practitioners
alike should read Fire in the East.
PHILIP L. RITCHESON

Falls Church, Virginia
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Lilley, James R., and David Shambaugh, eds. China’s
Military Faces the Future. New York: M. E. Sharpe,
1999. 356pp. $29.95

This collection of high-quality essays by
some of the leading experts on the Chinese
military is the product of the 1997 Seventh
Annual Conference on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), sponsored by the
American Enterprise Institute. The authors, although inspired by different security and threat perceptions, present sober,
straightforward, and reasonable assessments of PLA efforts to modernise itself in
the 1990s and of its prospects for the immediate future. Evidence drawn from the
essays shows that the PLA is increasingly
modern, confident, and assertive but that
it has not yet developed sophisticated theories and technologies comparable to
those of the United States or relevant to
fighting an American-style, high-tech limited war, or any war beyond its borders.
The provocative variations on this theme,
shaped by starkly different—seemingly
contradictory, yet ultimately reinforcing—dynamics of Chinese and East Asian
politics, are instrumental in defining the
evolution and nature of the PLA.
This perceptive, informative, and well
written book is divided into four sections:
on the “New High Command,” “Doctrine,
Strategy, and Weapons,” the “Support
Base,” and “China’s Northeast Asian Security Environment.” Each section has its
strengths. After a careful but critical examination of biographical materials on
new military leaders, the first provides
unusual insight into the PLA’s inner circle
of decision making by identifying two
fundamental changes in civil-military relations in the post-Deng era. First, none
of the top party leaders has any military
background or connections, whereas none
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of the senior military commanders and
political commissars has any experience
in party politics. Second, professionalism
and corporatism prevail in the PLA. This
distinct disconnection between the party
and the PLA challenges the traditional
mind-set of the “interlocking directorate
of the party and the military,” namely,
that the party is the army, while the army
is the party.
The second section gives readers a serious
but enjoyable discussion of doctrinal,
strategic, and weaponry issues reflecting
different schools of thought among
scholars and analysts. One school holds
that the PLA would no longer squander
human life by sending waves of peasants
against Western firepower as Mao Zedong
once did. Advocates of this way of thinking argue that high-tech weapons have
become the PLA’s new hallmark but that
it has a long way to go before it achieves
the level of operational capability and
technological sophistication its leadership
desires. The fatal weakness lies in its
strategy, doctrine, and weapons, which
remain thirty to forty years behind those
of the United States. The other school of
thought insists that the PLA is in fact not
so far behind the United States. Data offered here (the excellent bibliography in
Chinese and the appendix) is empirical
proof that the PLA actively studies the
revolution in military affairs and is applying its lessons, developing sophisticated weapons, and acquiring advanced
combat systems for asymmetric warfare.
The modernized PLA could likely
threaten the vital interests of the United
States and its East Asian allies in the
near future. Whether or not these concerns are justified, there is little doubt
that the PLA is catching up with its regional counterparts.
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The third section offers a professionally
knowledgeable overview and analysis of
the PLA’s budget, logistics, and technology, detailing some “contradictions” inherent in the support system. For example,
the PLA’s modest defence budget is, at
least for now, qualitatively different from
those of industrialized countries; its essence is different, and its implications are
different. For whatever reasons, the
PLA has remained integrated within a
larger socioeconomic composite that is
able to provide unlimited resources for
soldiers and to focus procurement priorities on items suitable for conflict
scenarios with Taiwan.
A more troublesome issue, and one central to PLA logistics, is a continued debate
on centralization and decentralization.
Lack of consensus and resources often
forces the central command to encourage
units to find their own ways to survive
economically or to upgrade their weapons and equipment, even while it tries to
create a unified, reliable, and effective
support system.
The PLA’s most vulnerable aspect
remains its technological obsolescence.
Even though the PLA closely watches developments in military technologies,
progress in its key technologies is very
slow, and technical difficulties make its
military modernisation programs less
than ideal. The resulting inconsistent
policies and uneven development may
eventually neutralize the effectiveness of
its future operations.
The final section examines regional security issues with respect to the Korean
Peninsula and Japan, areas of deep concern in Washington at a time when
America’s presence there is already
stretched thin. The analysis shows that
China’s approach to Korea is rational.
The most visible factor is that Beijing
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does not want Pyongyang to collapse, politically or economically; at the same
time, Beijing is pessimistic about the reunification of North and South Korea.
Similarly, emerging nationalism in China
and in Japan, and military modernisation
in both nations, strengthen their threat
perceptions. A confrontation between
these two regional powers is possible, but
a military one would appear to be highly
unlikely in the near future. In short, regional stability and security hang on the
joint efforts of all regional powers.
The book has two major flaws concerning PLA capabilities. First, the authors of
these essays rely exclusively on their distinct assessments of PLA material power
and terms of reference, and these leave
unrecognized the role of Chinese spiritual power—that is, political indoctrination and nationalism—and of the incalculable advantages to the Chinese of fighting a war, whether high-tech or low-tech,
on their homeland. Second, naval readers
will regret the lack of an in-depth study
of the Chinese navy. Also, there is no
mention of recent developments in divesting the PLA of commercial enterprises, implementing the regulations of
joint operations, or in introducing a joint
support system.
All in all, the book is not only highly recommended for students of PLA studies
but will undoubtedly also interest readers
who have a general concern for Chinese
and East Asian security.
JIANXIANG BI

Kanata, Ontario, Canada

Kim, Duk-ki. Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia:
Geostrategic Goals, Policies and Prospects. Portland,
Ore.: Frank Cass, 2000. 261pp. $57.50
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The growing economic, strategic, and
cultural importance of Asia calls for a
U.S. foreign policy attuned to the
unique environment of this diverse area.
As this economic dreadnought emerges
from the fog of uneven treaties, wars,
and cultural misunderstanding, U.S.
politico-military thinkers must recognize the pressures of history and geography that will dislodge any policy not
firmly anchored in Asian realities.
Northeast Asia in particular, with its increasing importance in world trade, its
potential for undersea resource development, archipelagic territorial disputes, and
the possibility of environmental catastrophe caused by its rapid industrialization
and nuclear-waste dumping at sea, is vital
to U.S. geostrategic interests. These factors, coupled with historical regional animosities, a diminishing Russian and U.S.
military presence, a naval arms buildup,
and the associated ability to project power
from the sea, highlight that security in
Northeast Asia has assumed a decidedly
maritime flavor.
Competing interests and local concerns
abound. China desires to be a world
power and regional leader, if not a
full-fledged Asian hegemon. Japan quietly remilitarizes as it accepts a larger regional security role. South Korea desires
unification of the peninsula under democratic rule, eagerly awaiting the collapse
of the intransigent and Stalinist regime.
Finally, the United States and Russia have
growing regional economic and political
interests, accompanied by a waning military presence brought on by budget constraints and defense retrenchments. Thus
Northeast Asia, a bubbling cauldron that
may boil over at any moment, is a focus of
world attention.
This book is largely based on research
for the author’s doctoral dissertation.
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Commander Duk-ki Kim, Republic of
Korea Navy, has developed a wonderful
primer for anyone desiring to understand
the underlying factors of Northeast Asian
international relations and emerging
maritime issues. Kim’s purpose for writing this book was to design a cooperative
maritime security structure to enhance
security throughout Northeast Asia.
In this scrupulously footnoted and documented work, Kim calls for bilateral and
multilateral cooperative security among
historically adversarial Northeast Asian
nations. This framework for security will
not only strengthen understanding of
mutual security needs but also broaden
the definition of security beyond the traditional approach of unilateral defense.
Kim defines cooperative security as a system of security practiced with, rather
than against, adversaries. His suggested
maritime measures for security forums
include: naval arms control to provide
limitations and constraint; maritime
confidence building measures to provide
reassurance, confidence, and transparency;
and maritime cooperation to introduce habits of cooperation.
Kim argues that the opportunity exists
now for the regional powers to turn to
cooperative security measures in order to
lend stability to this historically unstable
area. This cooperation, he believes, will
go far in allaying fears of China’s growing
power-projection capability and Japan’s
acceptance of its growing regional security role. Cooperative security measures
will also help in resolving resource and
fisheries claims that threaten to erupt into
open hostilities. By providing a vehicle for
dialogue, cooperative security may serve
as an acceptable alternative in the
absence of any other formal institutional
structure to manage growing disputes.
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Kim’s first three chapters make an excellent summary of the overarching maritime political and strategic concerns that
undergird naval strategy in the region.
Kim follows with chapters that describe
U.S., Russian, and Japanese maritime
strategies and concerns, and he concludes
by showing how trying to amalgamate
these diverse interests can be greatly
eased by U.S. and Northeast Asian cooperative approaches on bilateral, regional,
and international levels to provide stability through a framework of dialogue on
peace and security.
As a naval officer intimately familiar
with the region, Kim assesses the limitations of his proposals, such as Northeast
Asian nations that are not yet ready for
full-scale negotiations on reductions in
naval forces. As these navies continue to
grow, he sees a need for agreements to
mitigate the inevitable high-seas misunderstandings. He also calls for more
transparency through increased ship visits and high-level official exchanges, as
well as cooperative development of offshore natural resources. As a further preventive measure, Kim suggests rules
governing fishery violations, to help
avoid dustups over fishing rights.
Although an excellent background read,
this book contains two flaws that, while
they do not detract from the central
theme or lessen its value as a resource,
may disconcert the reader. First, although much of Kim’s work was completed before 1999, the copyright date is
2000. Thus in a number of places Kim refers to actions that should occur “by the
next century,” or “by the year 2000.” Additionally, because of the dynamism of
naval growth within Northeast Asia,
much of the force structure he projects
for the future already exists (e.g., the
Luhai-class DDG alluded to on page 146
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joined the Chinese South Sea Fleet in
January 1999, and a Sovremenny DDG
entered the Chinese order of battle in
early 2000). Second, Kim does not treat
the Republic of Korea Navy as a major
regional actor, leaving it conspicuously
absent from his chapters on strategy and
concerns about cooperative maritime
security. This is a significant omission.
Korea is a growing naval power with
extensive regional concerns, and it is possibly the nation most likely to find itself
in armed conflict across its borders.
These gaps aside, this is a book worth
having in a library on modern Asia. The
extensive selected bibliography adds
value to this work as a resource on
Northeast Asian politico-military matters. It obviously should be required
reading for those involved in Northeast
Asian regional maritime issues, and it
would also be of interest to anyone seeking to understand the unique problems
of Northeast Asia and possible solutions
to them.
ROBERT MARABITO

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Weintraub, Stanley. MacArthur’s War: Korea and
the Undoing of an American Hero. New York: Free
Press, 2000. 385pp. $27.50

No figure of the Korean War looms quite
so large as General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, simultaneously brilliant, arrogant, inscrutable, successful, and
fallen—all the elements of a Greek tragedy.
His military career, spanning the major
portion of the twentieth century, also renders him appealing as a symbol of broader
themes of that war and of American society. So we come to Stanley Weintraub’s
MacArthur’s War, advertised on its dust
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jacket as a “fascinating, well rendered
history of the general who refuses to fade
away,” a book based on “extensive research in primary and secondary sources
and laced with colorful anecdotes.”
Unfortunately, the book is none of those
things but rather a facile, cobbled-together
mishmash of principally secondary
sources, laced with myriad errors of chronology, fact, and interpretation—all
poorly documented. When reading this
book, one feels not unlike Vice Admiral
James H. Doyle after reading a draft of a
Korean War history sent to him in the late
1950s: “Your versions of the Inchon assault and Hungnam redeployment contain
so many errors and distortions of fact and
of emphasis that I am unable to assist you
with my comment.” However, I would
like to make note of a baker’s dozen of
errors to provide specific evidence for my
general assertions.
The author states on page 107 that the
amphibious commander, Rear Admiral
Doyle, “had been Richmond Kelly
Turner’s operations officer in the final
months of World War II.” In fact, Doyle
served on Turner’s staff from August
1942 to March 1943; in the final months
of the war, Doyle was commanding the
cruiser Pasadena. These are not obscure
facts but can readily be found both in
George Dyer’s biography of Turner, The
Amphibians Came to Conquer, and in
Doyle’s official biography at the Naval
Historical Center.
Weintraub writes that Rear Admiral
Arleigh Burke explained to MacArthur
the need to sail early for Inchon because
of the typhoon season. “Although nearly
a month remained before departure, the
ship movement orders were issued immediately,” which would suggest that
the conversation took place around 15
August. Burke was good, but probably
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not that good. He did not arrive in Japan
until 3 September 1950, twelve days before the operation. He did have such a
conversation with MacArthur, but only
several days before the scheduled sailing, and with respect specifically to
Typhoon Kezia. This is all described in
Burke’s oral history, which is available
at the U.S. Naval Institute, and which apparently Weintraub consulted.
We also learn that during World War II
the 1st Marine Division “had stormed the
beaches of Guadalcanal, New Guinea,
New Britain, Peleliu, and Okinawa.” The
1st Marine Division did not assault any
beach or conduct any operation in New
Guinea, although several other smaller
Marine units did. That was an Army show.
Weintraub contends that Inchon was
largely possible only because a World
War II study conducted for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff assessed Inchon as a possible landing site: “Without such detailed
earlier data, MacArthur could not have
carried out Chromite on such a short
fuse.” None of the principals involved
have, to my knowledge, made reference
to such a study. Poor institutional memory is not unusual. Little was known
about Inchon in 1950, but someone recalled that Vice Admiral Thomas
Kinkaid, commander of the Seventh
Fleet, had accepted the Japanese surrender there in 1945. The U.S. Army had
run the port for a time. At Doyle’s insistence, a “frantic search turned up an
Army warrant officer, W. R. Miller, who
had lived on Wolmi Do and operated
Transportation Corps boats over Inchon
Harbor. . . . [He] forthwith joined Admiral Doyle’s staff.” (The reader can refer to
Robert Debs Heinl, Jr.’s Victory at High
Tide [Lippincott, 1968.])
In chapter 8, the author quotes from
James Alexander’s Inchon to Wonsan:
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“On the destroyer Borland, accompanying the escort carrier Badoeng Strait as
the Inchon flotilla moved north[,] . . .
Marine and FEAF [Far East Air Force] pilots could be picked up on ship’s radio.”
There has never been a U.S. Navy destroyer Borland, which one can confirm
in the Dictionary of American Naval
Fighting Ships, volume 1. Better yet, simply read the publisher’s description of Alexander’s book: “Alexander has created a
fictional destroyer, the USS John J.
Borland, and he records through this single ship the actual experiences of a number of real destroyers through their logs
and diaries.”
At one point, Weintraub has Lewis B.
Puller commanding the 1st Marines,
which he did. Later in the book, however, the author has Puller commanding
the 5th Marines; this would have undoubtedly surprised Ray Murray, who
actually did command the 5th Marines.
Also, Homer Litzenberg is given the 11th
Marines—he commanded the 7th
Marines—and Ray David, who won the
Congressional Medal of Honor at
Chosin, will be pleased to learn that, according to Weintraub, he became a Marine Corps commandant.
During the delay in landing X Corps because of land mines, Weintraub writes,
MacArthur “insist[ed] that the amphibious operations proceed but with the 7th
Division now to make an alternative assault at Iwon.” That decision was mutually made by the X Corps Commanding
General (CG), Major General Edward Almond, with Doyle and Struble, aboard
the USS Mount McKinley on 24 October
1950. The reader can refer to the Naval
Historical Center’s Operational Archives.
Weintraub also tells us on page 169 that
“for Wonsan, Admiral Struble hastily assembled a twenty-one minesweeper

16

War College: Book Reviews

flotilla, including nine ships from the impounded Imperial Japanese Navy.” This
short sentence contains three errors of
fact. Struble, as Commander, Joint Task
Force, did not assemble the minesweeping
force. Captain Richard Spofford, commander of Mine Squadron 3, in fact reported to Vice Admiral Turner Joy as
Commander of Naval Forces Far East. Joy
intentionally kept control of the “sweeps.”
Burke requested the Japanese minesweepers on 2 October. These were not impounded Imperial Japanese Navy ships
but Japanese Maritime Safety Agency
(JMSA) vessels that had been actively
sweeping the Inland Sea since the end of
World War II. On 6 October, the JMSA
quietly authorized twenty minesweepers,
four patrol boats (to act as mother ships),
and one other vessel, to deal with magnetic mines. Some went to Korea’s west
coast, and ten or twelve went to Wonsan,
as stated in Burke’s oral history.
It is in its discussion of Hungnam, however, that the book really shines. On page
287, Weintraub blithely writes that “stowage diagrams for troops and equipment
were ignored daily as troops filled whatever
ships were available.” This statement implies
a willy-nilly process of outloading at
Hungnam. Nothing could be farther from
the truth. Burke began to hold shipping in
Japan in mid-November; Doyle issued Operation Order 19-50 on 29 November, for
planning purposes; his control and loading
plan was issued on 11 December; and he issued Operation Order 20-50 on 13 December. Doyle’s action report describes an
expeditious but well organized movement
of shipping in and out of Hungnam Harbor. Loading officers quickly developed an
ability to estimate loading capacities without diagrams. The author’s casual assertion
not only is inaccurate but does a disservice to those who did the job. One need
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only read Doyle’s article “December
1950 at Hungnam,” in the April 1979
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, to understand this.
The author then puzzles over why Chinese forces did not put more pressure on
the Hungnam perimeter. He concludes it
was “as if a gentlemen’s agreement were
in force.” Major General O. P. Smith, CG
1st Marine Division, had a different
notion. In a 12 December letter to his wife
Esther (which can be found in his personal papers at the Marine Corps University Research Archives, Quantico), the
general observed that “six Chinese divisions will not bother anyone for a while”;
the Marines, assisted by “old man winter,”
had already taken a terrible toll on their
attackers. Organic X Corps artillery was
used for close support. Doyle had used
two heavy cruisers, four to seven destroyers, and three LSMRs (medium
landing ships equipped with rockets)
throughout (augmented on “Dog Day”
by the battleship Missouri) for naval gunfire support, area harassment fire, illumination, and deep support. Doyle also had
the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at Yongpo
and Task Force 77 aircraft on call. From
9 to 24 December, 2,932 eight-inch
high-capacity, 14,491 five-inch proximity-fuzed, and 3,741 five-inch illuminating rounds were fired at Hungnam.
Weintraub also errs in his summary of
the outloading statistics for Hungnam,
which are among the most widely published
figures from the Korean War, asserting
that “550,000 estimated tons of bulk cargo”
were lifted. The actual figure was “350,000
measurement tons” (refer to the Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center).
The caption for a photograph of MacArthur and other officers on Mount McKinley’s flag bridge on the morning of the
Inchon landing mislabels one of the
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officers as Vice Admiral Struble; it was
actually Rear Admiral Doyle. Struble was
aboard his own flagship, the cruiser Rochester. According to protocol, MacArthur
should have been aboard Struble’s ship;
however, he elected to go with Doyle instead. The irony is that Doyle and Struble
enjoyed a strong mutual antipathy.
It would have been useful to be able to refer
to Weintraub’s sources to trace the origins
of his errors, but unfortunately, he condescends that “endnote numbers are eschewed
as intrusive, as are most footnotes.” He believes that “extensive back matter notes”
on each chapter’s sources would suffice.
(It is worth mentioning that the Marine
Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-0,
Leading Marines—primarily intended for
young enlisted Marines—shows there as
FMFM 101.) It is impossible to ascertain
from his back-matter notes where specific
material originated, unless one compares
the text line by line with each source mentioned. I tried to do that for the dialog the
author offers for the famous 23 August 1950
“showdown” meeting regarding the Inchon
landing. Parts comport with published accounts and participants’ recollections, but
some of it I have never seen before. Perhaps it came from sources unnamed, but
without notes one cannot be certain.
Notes are not a luxury or, to use Weintraub’s
word, an “intrusion.” The author must
know that. Notes are at the heart of rigorous scholarly research. Research is a social process, and its linchpin is the ability of
other scholars to check the validity of reported findings. Ultimately, MacArthur’s
War contributes little to our understanding of the Korean War. It is so fraught with
errors that it cannot be taken seriously.
It is a regrettable book.
DONALD CHISHOLM

Naval War College
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Cable, James. The Political Influence of Naval Force
in History. New York: St. Martin’s, 1998. 213pp.
$59.95

Sir James Cable is a noted writer on naval
affairs. His Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919–1991
is a well regarded classic on the role of
naval force.
His latest work is a historical survey of
the political purposes for which governments have made use of naval force.
Cable defines “naval force” as that “exercised by fighting ships manned by
disciplined sailors at the direction of a
central command responsible to the
political leadership.” His definition is
necessary to distinguish naval force as
we understand it today from the force
exercised by pirates, privateers, adventurers, and users of “landing craft”
(such as those that brought Roman soldiers to Britain in 55 A.D.) or galleys,
which served merely as conveyances to
bring soldiers together for seaborne
hand-to-hand combat.
Cable examines the extent to which naval
force furthered the political purposes of
the governments that used it—the scale
and nature of the force employed are not
otherwise considered relevant. He focuses
on examples of the use of force “for political purposes in which the naval element
is significant, the facts are reasonably well
established, and the degree of success or
failure and the durability of the result
are clear enough for useful conclusions
to be drawn.”
This definition thus largely excludes
consideration of fighting at sea before the
1500s, because standing navies were rare,
thus precluding the presence of disciplined officers and sailors. Portugal in
the sixteenth and the Netherlands in the
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seventeenth century first used naval
force for political purposes, with great
success in founding large empires. The
establishment of global empires and
expanded seaborne trade fostered the
emergence of significant national navies
(as opposed to privateers and pirates).
Cable surveys various instances when the
use of naval force had profound,
long-lasting political effects. Obviously,
victories in major sea battles like Trafalgar
or Tsushima, the ultimate use of naval
force, could have significant political fallout. Yet the uses of naval force did not
have to be that dramatic to have such
effect. Cumulative efforts—such as those
of the British to attain command of the
seas in the eighteenth century; of the
British (and others) to stamp out the
slave trade in the nineteenth century; of
the Union navy to blockade the Confederacy during the Civil War; of the German submarine campaigns to interdict
sea traffic to Great Britain; and of the
Japanese campaign to conquer Southeast
Asia—all had long-lasting political consequences, even if the eventual outcomes
were not always intended.
Discrete exercises of noncombat naval
forces have also had huge political consequences. For instance, the Dutch navy’s
successful landing of William of Orange
in England enabled the Glorious Revolution and all that followed from it in Britain (and Ireland). French naval
intervention off Yorktown in 1781 was
critical in ending the American Revolution. (“Indeed, we can scarcely expect to
encounter any result of the use of naval
force for political purposes that is larger
or more lasting than the independence of
the United States.”) The U.S. Navy’s
“opening of Japan” had profound effects
on that nation’s development and thus
Japan’s impact on subsequent world
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history. More recently, the Royal Navy’s
attack on the French navy in July 1940
was intended in part to influence American political opinion concerning British
resolve to resist Nazi Germany.
Political influence from naval force can
be latent as well. German construction
of its High Seas Fleet, as well as British
contemplation of “Copenhagening”
that fleet in the decade before World
War I, negatively affected the political
environment of that era. The rise of the
Soviet Navy in the 1970s and 1980s significantly affected U.S. political debate
about national security; arguably, “the
growth [in the 1980s] of the U.S. Navy
probably caused greater harm to the Soviet Union than all the confrontations at
sea put together.”
Cable does not really address “dogs that
did not bark”—that is, the absence of
naval force, or more properly, the failure to use it. A counterfactual argument
is usually difficult to make convincingly.
However, the Royal Navy’s failure to
stop Italy from using the Suez Canal in
1935 during the Ethiopian campaign,
and the impact of that failure on the European political scene, would appear to
be a good case in point. It has been
thought that the absence of strong Royal
Navy forces in Singapore in 1941 played
into Japanese political calculations. This
would seem a good area for inquiry as
the United States enters the Quadrennial Defense Review season. The Navy,
like the other services, generally makes
affirmative arguments for what it provides the nation; the possible consequences of not having the capability to
be engaged is less often argued, yet may
be even more compelling.
Cable ends with some “lessons and speculations.” These are, unfortunately, not
sharply focused. As he admits, it is hard
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to discern any real patterns from his historical survey, and even if any exist, the
stockbroker’s warning that “future results
cannot be predicted from past performance”
applies. At best, “if anything approaching
a principle emerges from the confused
record of the past it may be that the natural political environment for navies,
their raison d’être, is the unforeseen. . . .
Warships allow choice, naval force is a
flexible instrument.”
The book is a good short summary of the
political uses of naval force, both intended and unintended, over the past
fifty years. However, it is of limited value
in helping today’s defense analysts and
policy makers think through the requirements for tomorrow’s naval forces.
JAN VAN TOL

Commander, U.S. Navy
CNO Executive Panel Staff

Lambert, Nicholas. Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press,
1999. 364pp. $39.95

This is a very good book and a very important one. Nicholas Lambert has followed in the path of Jon Sumida’s In
Defense of Naval Supremacy to present a
lucid, compelling, and comprehensive
analysis of the policies of Admiral Sir
John Fisher and the Royal Navy in the
decade before 1914. This work is based
upon Lambert’s doctoral study of the development of the submarine, but it goes
much farther than his original work in
explaining the fundamental elements of
Fisher’s naval policies and their effects on
the Royal Navy.
Lambert’s command of the primary
sources is remarkable. He supplements
grand strategy, national financial policy,
and politics with the details of
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operational and tactical concepts with a
skill that illuminates the linkages between
the various levels and gives them all sufficient and appropriate weight. His treatment not only lays bare the superficial
nature of much previous historical research in this era but also indicates the
degree to which that superficiality has
caused our understanding of the period
to be profoundly flawed.
The book is not an easy read, but Lambert’s solid prose and grasp of his narrative allow the reader to follow his way
through the labyrinth that was British
naval policy in the Fisher era. To detail
all its facets would take up an entire issue
of the Naval War College Review, but
some explanation is worthwhile.
Lambert makes clear that Fisher was installed as First Sea Lord in 1904 primarily
to cut spending at a time when the British government desperately needed to
achieve economies in its budget. He shows
that Fisher developed extraordinary
schemes to utilize emergent technology
to maintain Britain’s naval dominance
when that dominance was being increasingly challenged and the country’s ability
to pay becoming ever more dubious. He
shows too that Fisher’s ideas of dominance
always focused on Britain’s worldwide requirements, particularly in the protection
of sea communications (the threat from
Germany was not the primary motivation
of British naval policy until much later).
Lambert shows the devious way in which
Fisher operated, often concealing his true
motivations from politicians and naval
colleagues alike, but he also maps out the
logic behind the admiral’s approach. To
Sumida’s explanation of the origins of
the battle cruiser as the worldwide instrument of commerce protection, Lambert adds the concept of the “flotilla,” by
which small craft—both surface and
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submersible—with torpedoes would
close the “narrow seas” around the British Isles and the Mediterranean to the
operation of enemy battle fleets and protect Britain and its possessions from attack. “Flotilla defence” would effectively
replace the capital ship as the primary element in Britain’s naval strength.
Lambert shows how Fisher always returned
to these ideas as the best ways for Britain
to utilize both its technological advantages
and its strategic geography to achieve affordable naval supremacy. Even in retirement Fisher continued his efforts, and
Lambert has discovered incontrovertible
proof that in 1914, when the overseas
building rates of battleships had become
more than British finances could match,
Fisher persuaded Winston Churchill, the
young First Lord, to cancel the construction of at least two battleships and divert
the funding to submarines and destroyers. In other words, the British in 1914
were on the point of stopping battleship
construction altogether.
Lambert’s mastery of detail is apparent
throughout this volume, but there are
four aspects that are most important for
the readership of the Naval War College
Review and for the challenges ahead.
The first is Lambert’s exposition of the
issues that the Royal Navy faced as an organisation, some of which will have a
particular resonance for the contemporary audience. Finance was always a fundamental concern, but there were other
factors as well. Cutting construction to
save money jeopardised the existence of
the industrial capacity on which Britain’s
latent supremacy at sea rested. Much of
Britain’s power derived from the fact that
it could, in the final event, construct and
arm more warships more quickly than
any rival; it was essential that this ability
be maintained. The “We Want Eight”
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crisis of 1909 may thus have had Fisher’s
desire to sustain that capability as its primary cause, rather than his fears of German expansion.
The British also faced a crisis of manpower. Not only was the Royal Navy
hard pressed to recruit sufficient personnel to man the increasing numbers
of battleships and armoured cruisers
entering service in the first years of the
century, but retention was poor, particularly amongst the more highly skilled
ratings vital to their operation. Even if
the government provided the funds,
the Navy did not have the human capacity to expand indefinitely to match
increases in foreign naval capability. The
primary focus of the redeployment process, which saw the removal of ships
from overseas stations and the apparent concentration of forces in British
waters, was not the German threat but
the need to employ manpower more efficiently; perhaps, also, by retaining
ships in home waters rather than keeping them semipermanently overseas it
would improve the quality of life of the
ships’ companies. The peacetime deployment of the fleet therefore did not
necessarily reflect the intentions for its
operations in a conflict.
A corollary to this is the fact that the primary focus of the Admiralty’s effort was
the defence of the empire as a whole; the
force that it sought to create was always
intended to have worldwide responsibilities. The fleet that fought the 1914–18
war in the North Sea, the “Grand Fleet of
Battle,” was an attempt to use resources
that had been created the previous decade
to the greatest effect within a theatre that
was much more confined than had been
expected only a few years earlier. The enemies that Britain faced in 1914 did not
include Italy or any other power with the
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potential to interfere with British maritime communications to the degree Russia or France could have. As it was, the
problems of organising the Grand Fleet
to be an effective tactical entity were such
that many in the Royal Navy did not regard it as a practical offensive force. The
results of Jutland show they had a point.
Thus we see the importance of Lambert’s
careful inclusion of what was going on in
the fleets at sea in terms of operational innovation and development. Sir John Fisher’s
Naval Revolution makes it absolutely
clear that whatever their failings in critical thinking, staff work, and analytical
method, the senior officers of the Royal
Navy were not operating in an intellectual
vacuum, and that those in seagoing command were energetically attempting to
exploit the emergent technology to the
full. Because these officers were responsible
for the fighting efficiency of the Royal
Navy, however, they were required to work
with what they had. As with the aircraft
carrier in the 1920s and 1930s, this reality
explains the contemporary logic of many
decisions that seem misguided in retrospect. It also explains a good part (though
not all) of the opposition to Fisher’s ideas,
even amongst his erstwhile supporters,
and thus a good part (though not all) of
Fisher’s deviousness. At the same time,
Lambert does not neglect the effects of
personality and party in his description of
the controversies that raged over Fisher
and naval policy. There are human beings
in this book.
Lambert’s mastery of context is, above
all, why this work should be read by all
who are involved with naval policy. He
analyses the elements of British decision
making and its consequences in terms of
contemporary conditions, not hindsight.
Lambert clearly explains the ways in
which solutions and makeshifts were
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developed to answer, in the time available, the problems that the Royal Navy
faced. He places clear and necessary emphasis on the British need to maintain
warfighting capabilities year by year, in
spite of all the stresses on the budget and
the “stop-go” nature of so many of the
new capabilities, such as the submarine
and long-range gunnery fire control. In
the uncertain strategic environment of
the opening years of the twentieth century, the Royal Navy could not afford to
surrender existing or immediately available battle power in favor of unproven
systems. Nor could it permit the deterioration of the industrial capacity that allowed it to outbuild rivals in an
emergency, or continue to seek “more of
the same” at the expense of national finances. However ambitious Fisher’s
ideas, all of what he did was influenced by
these imperatives, as he sought to position
the navy to exploit new possibilities.
Lambert’s story of the Royal Navy before
1914 presents a picture completely different from the accepted one, but it is a picture that is solidly founded in primary
sources. Equally to the point, it is one
that is wholly convincing in total and
represents a more satisfying explanation
of what happened, and why, than we
have ever had before. It is a study that
should sound a familiar note for those
who have themselves had to struggle with
the same sort of problems in other navies
and defence forces in recent years.
As one who has written on the operational history of the Royal Navy in the
opening months of the First World War,
I now believe that such history, and indeed the entire history of the war at sea,
needs to be approached anew. I also believe that Lambert’s work proves that we
should look again at more of the history
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of twentieth-century navies with the
same comprehensiveness.
JAMES GOLDRICK

Captain, Royal Australian Navy

Maffeo, Steven E. Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 355pp. $32.95

In Most Secret and Confidential, Steven
Maffeo has written an exceptional study
of how intelligence was collected and
used during the French Revolutionary
Wars and the Napoleonic Wars of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
To limited degrees, the intelligence activities of the United States, Spain, Russia,
Denmark, and several other European
nations are described. More detail is provided concerning the excellent French intelligence efforts under Napoleon. The bulk
of the text, however, deals with the use of
intelligence by the British government,
especially the Admiralty, during the years
between 1793 and 1815.
Maffeo, who is a commander in a naval
reserve intelligence unit, has combined
his intelligence expertise with the skills
of an accomplished historian to write
this informative and most enjoyable
history of British intelligence efforts
during this period. His knowledge of
the history of intelligence operations is
excellent, and his grasp of the British
navy of this era is unsurpassed. He uses
not only primary sources (government
papers and personal letters) to document his work but also the books of such
novelists as C. S. Forester and Patrick
O’Brian to make his points.
The opening chapter describes how the
British government collected intelligence. It has been clear that Lloyd’s of
London, by means of its agents located
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around the world, was able to provide a
continuous flow of intelligence to the government, but it is fascinating to learn
that by virtue of opening diplomatic and
personal mail, the British Post Office
became the largest intelligence-gathering branch of the government.
Subsequent chapters treat other aspects of
the British intelligence effort. The Admiralty’s collection and use of intelligence is
discussed in depth, and so is the transmission of information. The difficulties are
shown of sending any type of message, especially when the usual form of communication at sea was signal flags, which were
useless at night or in limited visibility,
such as in battle. The subject of several
chapters is the commander as his own intelligence officer. Some commanders, such
as Nelson, were expert intelligence officers; others were not. However, all commanders had to sort through whatever
information was available to them and
make the best decisions they could—they
were literally on their own. Communications between detached fleets and the Admiralty often took weeks, if not months.
Commanders, therefore, without knowledge of the current government policy,
would ultimately decide on courses of action. The fact that they were fully supported by the Admiralty and the
government demonstrates the high level
of intelligence skills among the officers of
the Royal Navy.
The concluding chapters are case studies
that show what role intelligence, or the
lack thereof, played in three naval engagements. They are remarkable summations of the Indian Ocean action of Pulo
Aur in February 1804, the Copenhagen
expedition of December 1800–April
1801, and the Nile campaign of March
through August 1798. These three chapters form an excellent conclusion.
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This is a must read for every intelligence
officer, and for any member of the military who is interested in the history of intelligence. It should also be on the
reading list of every military and naval
historian, most history buffs, and fans of
naval fiction of this period. It
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substantiates that such fictional characters as Horatio Hornblower and Jack
Aubrey are soundly based on historical
fact, and that their activities, especially
concerning intelligence, are authentic.
MICHAEL RIGGLE

Naval War College
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